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1 Introduction
Following Maynard Smith’s [1974] seminal contribution, competition for a prize is often
modeled as the war of attrition. In this game, players choose the time at which they intend to flee.
Time is costly, and players may differ in their opportunity costs. The player who waits the longest
wins the prize and both players pay a cost proportional to the time it takes for the losing player
to flee. Maynard Smith [1974] refers to this type of interaction as a “display”. In a display, no
physical contact takes place, or if it does, it does not settle the battle or convey information about
which player would win an escalated conflict.
The main contribution of our paper is that we develop and analyze a game in which at any
moment, players cannot only wait or flee, but also have the option to actively start a fight. In case of
fight, a battle ensues and the stronger player wins the prize while the losing player incurs a loss. This
dynamic Fight-or-Flight game allows us to make sense of a much wider variety of competitions.
It captures the essence of many types of interactions in which the timing of actions plays a crucial
role, such as R&D races, litigation, the launch of political or advertisement campaigns, and firm
acquisitions. It also fits situations in the animal kingdom, where animals fight over territory or
prey. In all these examples, players can ‘flee’ (e.g., reduce R&D spending, settle), wait to see if the
other gives in, or initiate a fight (e.g., suing the opponent, start a hostile takeover), forcing the other
into a battle.
Our dynamic game helps to understand why in some situations players want to wait and see if
the other flees without a battle, while in other circumstances both want to act as quickly as possible.
To illustrate the former type of situation, consider two political candidates who may wait a long
time before they officially announce that they are running for office. If the other flees without a
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battle, they avoid the costs of a costly campaign that is required to win a fight. Male elephant seals
who contest the right of exclusive access to a harem usually wait a couple of minutes to allow the
other to flee without a bloody fight.
In other instances, players want to act as quickly as possible. A firm that wants to expand its
market by acquiring a competitor should act quickly, to prevent the prospective target from selling
its valuable assets. Another possible interpretation is that, compared to letting the other escape,
by winning a fight the player sends a stronger signal about its strength to other players, thereby
discouraging other players from ever making a challenge. A firm that drives out another firm by
force will deter potential future competitors more than if the other firm left voluntarily. In a lawless
society without a state monopoly of violence, people may want to rob each other if they can. In
an encounter, the stronger player prefers to act as quickly as possible to avoid that the other flees
without losing his money.
Notice that both types of examples are not well described by the war of attrition. In the first
type of example it may happen that players fight after a waiting period which is not a possibility
in the war of attrition. The war of attrition also does not capture the essence of the second type of
interaction. In particular, the war of attrition does not accommodate that strong players decide to
fight in a split-second.
In this paper, we analyze the Fight-or-Flight game theoretically and experimentally. Theoret-
ically, we identify a key-parameter, the “deterrence value”, that determines how the competition
between two players will unfold. The deterrence value is the amount that a player earns on top of the
prize if the other player manages to escape. Our theoretical analysis based on standard preferences
yields two main novel insights. First, if the deterrence value is negative all player types will rush
and act in a split-second. A negative deterrence value is illustrated by the sale of valuable assets by
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a fleeing prospective firm in the takeover example. If the deterrence value is positive, players prefer
to avoid the costly fight and wait before they act. In the example where two political candidates
engage in a battle for office, the costs to organize a campaign represent a positive deterrence value.
The second insight is that if the deterrence value is positive but not too large, sorting will occur
in the dynamic Fight-or-Flight game. That is, the weakest players will flee just before the end.
Thus, the dynamic structure helps players to avoid costly fights, in comparison to a static version
of the game that is stripped of its time element. These two results cannot be obtained in a standard
war of attrition. In that game, players’ waiting correlates positively with their strength, and rushing
by all types is never observed in equilibrium. Moreover, the dynamic standard war of attrition does
not help players to sort and avoid costly fights in comparison to the static version (e.g., see Hörisch
and Kirchkamp [2010]).
We also investigate what happens in a behavioral model in which players differ in their degree of
risk aversion. This model yields two additional testable implications. First, it predicts that sorting
will occur in a wider set of circumstances than in the standard model. Second, it predicts that the
more risk averse players flee more frequently before the end.
We test the predictions in an experiment in which we systematically vary the deterrence value
and the dynamic/static nature of the game between treatments. Our experimental findings support
some of the key features of the theory, at least in terms of its comparative statics. With a negative
deterrence value subjects quickly learn to decide in a split-second. With a positive deterrence value,
subjects tend to wait much longer and indeed use time to sort. In agreement with the model of
heterogeneous risk aversion, we find that endogenous timing reduces the likelihood of costly battles
in a wider set of circumstances than predicted by standard theory. Subjects who are classified as
more risk averse on the basis of an independent task are indeed the ones that tend to flee more often
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early in the game. Thus, while not all results are consistent with the point predictions of the model,
in terms of comparative statics behavior often moves in the expected direction.
An interesting finding that deviates from the predictions is that a sizable minority of subjects
fight early when the deterrence value is positive. This is the case even after ample time to learn. This
finding is in stark contrast with some behavioral findings in related dynamic games. For instance,
Roth et al. [1988] report that the deadline effect, a striking concentration of agreements in the final
seconds of the game, is the most robust behavioral finding in a class of games designed to test
axiomatic models of Nash bargaining. Roth and Ockenfels [2002] and Ockenfels and Roth [2006]
identify substantial last-minute bidding in second-price auctions. They attribute this phenomenon
of sniping to both strategic and naïve considerations of the bidders. We discuss some potential
explanations for the anomaly of early fighting in our contest game at the end of the results section.
One feature of our experimental design is that time is discrete but with very short time intervals.
This makes it hard for subjects to precisely time their actions, and could be one of the reasons
behind the decrease in costly battles in the dynamic games. In a follow-up experiment, we make
it easier for subjects to time their action, by making the time intervals longer. Consistent with the
theoretical predictions, we no longer observe a decrease in battles compared to the static games
when the deterrence value is negative. In other respects, the results closely resemble that of the
original experiment.
Our paper contributes to the literature on dynamic games in which players compete for a
prize. Several studies compare dynamic with static environments. Hörisch and Kirchkamp [2010]
investigate how experimental subjects behave in static and dynamic versions of the war of attrition
and some closely related games. Theoretically, the dynamic version of a war of attrition does
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not help players to sort, and indeed, they do not observe such a difference in their experiments.1
Theoretically, in an auction with symmetric interdependent valuations, Goeree and Offerman
[2003a] do not find that the efficiency of a dynamic English auction is improved compared to the
static second-price auction. In contrast, Kirchkamp and Moldovanu [2004] investigate a setup
where a bidder’s value is determined by his own signal in combination with the signal of his right
neighbor. In this setting, bidders can retrieve valuable information in a dynamic auction process.
In an experiment, they find that the efficiency of the English auction is higher than in a second-price
auction in which no such information can be retrieved, which accords with theory.2
1There is a large literature on static contest games. Carrillo and Palfrey [2009] study a contest
game that is quite close to our static benchmark. They find that subjects compromisemore often than
in equilibrium, and they discuss some explanations based on cognitive limitations. De Dreu et al.
[2016] investigate a game in which a group of attackers competes with a group of defenders. They
find that in-group defense is stronger and better coordinated than out-group aggression. Oprea et
al. [2011] show how the matching protocol affects outcomes in continuous time Hawk-Dove games.
Dechenaux et al. [2015] provide a survey of the experimental literature on contest games.
2The war of attrition has been applied to various settings, including versions with private
information [Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986; Ponsati and Sákovics, 1995] and applications to public
good provision [Bliss and Nalebuff, 1984; Weesie, 1993]. Oprea et al. [2013] experimentally study
war of attrition games with two-sided private information (as in Fudenberg and Tirole [1986]) and
observe behavior close to theoretical predictions. More generally, the study of dynamic games
reveals novel insights that significantly surpass what we know from the study of static games.
Recent contributions include Potters et al. [2005], Levin and Peck [2008], Ivanov et al. [2009],
Kolb [2015] and Agranov and Elliott [2017]. The recent experimental literature on continuous
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The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 introduces the Fight-or-
Flight game and presents the theory. Section 3 discusses the experimental design and procedures.
Section 4 provides the experimental results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 Dynamic Fight-or-Flight game
We first describe the dynamic version of the Fight-or-Flight game. In this section, we present a
basic version of the game. In section 2.3 and Appendix B we discuss several extensions.
Time is discrete, with a finite number of periods t = 0, 1, ...,T . For each t < T , as long as the
game has not ended, the two players independently decide to wait, flee (R, for "retreat"), or fight
(F). In the final period, players can no longer wait and have to choose F or R. The game ends
with at least one player choosing F or R, at which point the action set becomes null. At the start,
each player i is privately informed of her fighting ability ai. It is common knowledge that ai is
independently drawn from a uniform distribution over the unit interval. A player’s strategy lists
for every ability the number of periods in which she chooses to wait and her choice if play reaches
the period in which she wants to act. A player type’s strategy s(ai) is described as (t, A), where
A ∈ {F, R}. This means that player i with ability ai will choose action A (fight or flee) in period t
if the other player did not fight or flee earlier.
The game ends as soon as one of the players decides to fight or flee. The outcome can be a
battle or an escape. A battle occurs if the player with the shortest waiting time chooses to fight or if
time experiments shows that outcomes in continuous time may substantially differ from outcomes
in discrete time [Friedman and Oprea, 2012; Oprea et al., 2014; Bigoni et al., 2015; Calford and
Oprea, 2017].
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they both choose to fight at the same time. An escape occurs if the player with the shortest waiting
time chooses to flee or if they both choose to flee at the same time. If one of the players chooses
to fight and the other chooses to flee at the same time, an escape occurs with probability p and a
battle with probability 1 − p.
Payoffs. In case of a battle, the player with the higher ability receives vh > 0 (the prize) and the
other earns −vl , where vh, vl > 0. In case of an escape, the player who chose to flee earns 0
while the other earns vh + k, the prize plus a deterrence payoff k. This deterrence value can be
positive or negative. A positive deterrence value captures situations where fighting is costly, so
that players prefer to get the prize without fighting for it. A negative deterrence value captures
situations in which beating the other generates a higher value compared to when the other escapes.
We restrict the analysis to k > −vh, so that if the other escapes this always gives a higher payoff
than escaping. As tie breaking rules, we assume that if there is a battle between equally strong
players, it is randomly determined (with equal probability) which player receives vh and which
player receives −vl . If both players decided to flee at the same time, it is randomly determined
(with equal probability) who earns 0 and who earns vh + k. Alternatively, players could be allowed
to share the prize equally in case that they both flee. This would not affect the theoretical analysis
if players are risk neutral.
We assume that players maximize their expected utility and do not discount the future. In
Appendix B, we analyze the case with discounting, but here our aim is to show how time per
se affects the ability of players to sort themselves according to their strength. The case without
discounting is also relevant for many cases, such as when the cost of waiting is small compared to
the prize, the maximum duration of the game is short, or the consumption of the prize happens at
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a fixed point in time.3
We allow for the possibility that players are risk averse. To keep the model parsimonious, we
assume that each player’s utility function is piecewise linear in the payoff x and given by:
U(x) =

x i f x ≥ 0
λx i f x < 0
(1)
Here, λ > 0 captures the degree of risk aversion (for λ > 1) or risk seeking (0 < λ < 1).
Naturally, when λ > 1, this specification is also consistent with loss aversion. Our approach does
not distinguish between loss and risk aversion.
2.2 Equilibrium
We look for pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria. In this section, we derive equilibria under
the assumption that players have threshold strategies, where types below a certain threshold flee
and types above that threshold fight. Intuitively, stronger types have more to gain from fighting.
We also assume that no type acts after the period in which the strongest type acts. In Appendix A,
we show that all equilibrium profiles satisfy these properties.
Negative deterrence value: −vh < k < 0. For a negative deterrence value, the payoff of winning
a battle exceeds that of allowing the other to escape. In this case, there is a unique equilibrium
outcome in which all players fight or flee immediately. The very strong types will want to fight, and
very weak types will want to flee. If the weakest types would flee after t = 0, the strongest types
have an incentive to fight before that, to avoid that the opponent escapes. But then the weakest
types would deviate to fleeing earlier. This implies that the strongest types fight immediately, and
the weakest types flee immediately. Any other type will then act immediately as well. Acting later
3By design, discounting also cannot play a role in the experiment.
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is costly, because it does not result in fewer battles with stronger types that fight, and gives weaker
types the possibility to escape.
With all types acting immediately, let type ã be indifferent between fighting and fleeing. All
stronger types fight and all weaker types flee. Suppose type ã flees. If the opponent is weaker, the
expected payoff is (vh + k)/2, and this happens with probability ã. If the opponent is stronger, a
battle results with probability 1 − p and this will always be lost by type ã, giving a payoff −λvl .
The expected payoff of fleeing is therefore given by:
ã 12 (v
h + k) + (1 − ã)(1 − p)(−λvl). (2)
Suppose type ã fights. A weaker opponent escapes with probability p, giving a payoff vh + k,
and otherwise there is a battle that will be won by type ã, giving a payoff vh. If the opponent is
stronger, there will always be a battle that will be lost by ã. The expected utility of fighting is then
given by:
ã[p(vh + k) + (1 − p)vh] + (1 − ã)(−λvl). (3)





h + pλvl + k(p − 12 )
. (4)
The threshold ã is increasing in the probability of an escape p. As p increases, fighting against
weaker types becomes less attractive since they become more likely to escape. More types will
then flee in equilibrium. The effect of k on ã depends on the value of p. For p < 12 , an increase in
k has a larger impact on the fleeing payoff than on the fighting payoff. This means fleeing becomes
more attractive, and more types will flee in equilibrium. For p > 12 , the reverse is true.
Positive deterrence value: k > 0. With a positive deterrence value, players are better off when the
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other manages to escape than when they win a battle. In this case, all the action will be concentrated
in the final two periods of the game. Intuitively, sufficiently strong players will wait until the last
period, to give other players the option to escape. Fighting should only take place in the last period.
Weaker types will then also prefer to wait until at least the penultimate period, since waiting until
then gives opponents the option to escape without the risk of ending up in a fight.
Consequently, for k > 0 there is a fraction of types that flees at T − 1 and a fraction that flees
at T . The remaining fraction fights at T . All types that flee have the same payoff independent of
the moment that they flee; they always lose a battle with a type that fights and their payoff when
the opponent flees is independent of their fighting ability. The equilibrium does therefore not pin
down which types flee first, only the fraction. To determine the fraction of types that flee, we can
assume w.l.o.g. that the weakest types flee at T − 1. The equilibrium can then be characterized by
two threshold levels â1 and â2 > â1. Type â1 is indifferent between fleeing at T − 1 and fleeing at
T . Type â2 is indifferent between fleeing at T and fighting at T . A fraction of types â1 flees at T − 1
and a fraction of types â2 − â1 flees at T . Types above â2 fight at T . The values of â1 and â2 are
given by:
â1 =
λvl[(vh − k)(1 − 2p) − 2kp2]





vh + k + 2(1 − p)λvl
. (5)
The fraction of types fleeing at T − 1 is positive for values of k below k̂, where
k̂ =
1 − 2p
1 − 2p + 2p2
vh. (6)
For larger values of k, all types wait until the final period. Intuitively, if k is large, it always pays
off to wait and give others the option to escape, even if that implies risking a battle with stronger
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types. The same is true for larger values of p. If the probability of an escape is large, it becomes
more attractive to wait, even if the opponent fights.
The foregoing shows that there can be three types of equilibrium outcomes. If k < 0, there is a
rushing equilibrium in which all types immediately fight or flee. For intermediate positive values
of k, there is a timing equilibrium in which some types wait until the penultimate period and then
flee, while all others wait until the final period and then fight or flee. For high values of k, there is
a waiting equilibrium in which all types wait until the last period and then fight or flee. While we
derived these equilibria under the assumption that players have threshold strategies, in Appendix A
we show that no other equilibria exist. The equilibrium outcome is generically unique, except for
k = 0 or k = k̂.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium).
(i) If k < 0, the unique equilibrium outcome is a ’rushing equilibrium’ in which all players act
immediately. Players with abilities [0, ã] flee at t = 0 and players with abilities (ã, 1] fight at t = 0,
(ii) If 0 < k < k̂, the unique equilibrium outcome is a ’timing equilibrium’ in which a fraction â1
of types flee in period T − 1, a fraction â2 − â1 of types flee in period T , and all types above â2 fight
in period T .
(iii) If k > max{k̂, 0}, the unique equilibrium outcome is a ’waiting equilibrium’ in which types
[0, ã] flee in period T and types (ã, 1] fight in period T, and ã = 1 for any vh < (1 − 2p)k.
Proof. All proofs are in Appendix A. 
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium outcomes. Figure 1a shows equilibrium outcomes for
different combinations of the probability of an escape (p) and the deterrence value (k). Figure 1b
shows how the threshold values change with k. For k < 0, fewer types fight as k increases. A
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higher k makes letting the other escape relatively more attractive, and such an escape becomes less
likely by fighting. This reverses for positive values of k, with more types fighting as k increases.
For higher values of k, fewer types flee early. Fighting becomes relatively more attractive with
more weaker types still around. The figure also illustrates how these thresholds change with an
increase in p.
To shed light on whether the dynamic time element of the Fight-or-Flight game decreases costly
battles, we use a static version of the game as benchmark. In the static game, players choose
simultaneously between fight and flee, and the same payoffs result as when players reach the final
period of the dynamic game. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the static game coincides with the
equilibrium of the dynamic game for parameters where all players act in the same period (that is,
either case (i) or case (iii) described in Proposition 1).
An interesting feature of the timing equilibrium of the dynamic game is that sorting takes place
over time, resulting in fewer battles compared to what happens in the static game. In the dynamic
game, the strongest types remain in the game until the last period, while some weaker types flee
before any battle may take place. Moreover, a smaller fraction of types will fight; fighting becomes
less attractive with fewer relatively weak players remaining.
Proposition 2 (Battles and sorting).
Compared to a static (simultaneous-move) version of the game:
(i) the frequency of battles is reduced in case of a timing equilibrium and the same in case of a
rushing or waiting equilibrium, and
(ii) the rate at which the weaker player in a pair manages to escape is increased in case of a timing




















Figure 1: Equilibrium outcomes with homogeneous risk aversion. In the top
panel, the solid dots indicate the experimentally implemented values (with vh =
vl = 10, p = 0.1, and k = {−6, 6, 12}). In the bottom panel, Rushing occurs to the
left of the vertical axis, Timing occurs between the vertical axis and the shaded
area, Waiting occurs in the shaded area. The dashed lines show a decrease in
the escape probability (p) (for p < 12 ). The dark shaded area shows the waiting
equilibrium for the lower value of p.
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2.3 Extensions
2.3.1 Heterogeneous risk aversion
A surprising feature of the analysis with a homogeneous population is that the set of deterrence
values for which the timing equilibrium materializes does not depend on players’ risk aversion.
This result changes when the population is heterogeneous in the degree of risk aversion. Intuitively,
players that are relatively averse to risks will want to flee earlier. Indeed, a population that is
heterogeneous in the degree of risk aversion can sustain a timing equilibrium for a larger set of
deterrence values. We show this in a simple framework with two levels of risk aversion and we
outline the two main strategic features of this model.
Suppose that a fraction 1 − q of the population has a risk aversion parameter λ1, and a fraction
q has λ2 > λ1. A player’s value of λ is private information but all players know the distribution.
Consider the case where q is very small. In that case, the threshold levels derived assuming
homogeneous risk aversion in Section 2.1 are not much affected for the less risk averse types. Fix
an equilibrium in which k > k̂, so that all types with λ1 wait until period T .
If λ2 is such that:
ã 12 (v
h + k) + (1 − ã)(1 − p)(−λ2vl) < 0, (7)
then types with λ2 and a fighting ability less than or equal to ã prefer to flee in period T − 1 while
types with λ1 prefer to wait until T . Thus, for the same level of k, we now have a timing equilibrium
instead of a waiting equilibrium.
Another feature of this model is that the more risk averse types will be the ones who flee more
frequently before the end. To see this, note that for the ability level for which the less risk averse
type is indifferent between fleeing in period T − 1 and period T , the more risk averse type still
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strictly prefers to flee in period T − 1. The reason is that the expected payoff of fleeing in period
T − 1 is not affected by the degree of risk aversion (since there are no negative payoffs), while the
expected payoff of fleeing in periodT decreases in a player’s risk aversion (since the negative payoff
when a battle is lost weighs more heavily). In the experiment we will test these two implications of
the model with heterogeneous risk aversion.
2.3.2 Other extensions
We also considered some natural extensions of the model. Here we describe themain qualitative
features of these extensions. In Appendix B we provide further details of these extensions, as well
as some discussion of the pros and cons of discrete versus continuous modelling in waiting games.
So far we simply assumed that the stronger player always wins a battle. A natural possibility
is that stronger types are more likely to win, but do not win with certainty. When relative strength
correlates sufficiently strongly with winning a battle, the results are qualitatively the same. That
is, with a positive deterrence value, all the action will be concentrated in the final two periods.
The strongest types still want to fight in the final period, while no type wants to flee before the
penultimate period. Likewise, with a negative deterrence value, all types will still act immediately.
When the link between relative strength andwinning a battle becomesweak, other types of equilibria
exist. In the extreme case, where each type has an almost equal chance of winning a battle against
any other type, there can be equilibria where all types prefer to fight, possibly at different periods.
There can also be an equilibrium in which all types prefer to flee in the last period.
Another natural extension is discounting of future payoffs. Conditional on a discount factor
sufficiently close to 1, our main theoretical findings remain qualitatively similar. That is, we find a
rushing equilibrium when k < 0, a timing equilibrium when 0 < k < k̂ and a waiting equilibrium
16
when k > max(0, k̂). Like in the timing equilibrium without discounting, all the action happens in
the penultimate and last period. The main difference with the model without discounting is that the
thresholds now also depend on the discount factor. When discounting is important, the comparison
between the static and dynamic case becomes less clear-cut in terms of welfare: the higher degree
of sorting comes at the cost of waiting longer.
A final variant that yields somewhat different predictions is the one where players face a known
cost for time. Here, it may happen that weak players decide to drop out earlier than the penultimate
period. With a cost of waiting, a more gradual fleeing of types may be observed in equilibrium.
In the experiment, we focus on the variant where time is not costly for two reasons. First, it
allows us to investigate in a meaningful way how the dynamic game helps players to avoid costly
battles compared to the static game where time plays no role. Second, we think that it is a stronger
result if players use time as a sorting device when time is not costly.
3 Experimental design and procedures
3.1 Design
Subjects participated in a laboratory experiment in which they played the Fight-or-Flight game.
In all treatments, we set the value of winning a battle to vh = 10 and losing a battle to −vl = −10.
The probability of an escape when at the same time one player decided to fight and the other decided
to flee was set to p = 0.1. Each subject played the game 40 rounds, with random rematching after
every round within a matching group of 8 subjects. At the start of each round, the subjects were
informed of their fighting ability for that round, which was an integer number from 0,1,2,..., 1000.
They knew that each number was equally likely, that each subject faced the same distribution and
that draws were independent across subjects and rounds. At the end of a round, each subject was
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informed of the outcome, the paired subject’s fighting ability, and the resulting payoffs.
We implemented two treatment variations. The first treatment variable was the deterrence
variable k, which was either -6, 6, or 12. The second treatment variable concerned the dynamic or
static nature of the Flight-or-Fight game. This gives a 3x2 design. Every subject participated in
only one of the treatments. In total, 360 subjects participated, with 7 or 8 independent matching
groups per treatment. Table 1 presents an overview.
In the dynamic Fight-or-Flight game, a 5 second countdown started after all subjects in the
laboratory had indicated that they were ready to start. This ensured that subjects knew exactly
when the game would start. During the game itself, a clock started counting down from 10 seconds
to 0. The program divided the 10 seconds in 50 periods of 200 milliseconds each. Subjects
implemented their strategies in real time. For instance a subject could decide to wait for 5 seconds
(i.e., for the first 25 periods), and to then choose to fight which would then determine the outcome
of the game (unless the other subject had already terminated the game earlier). This way she would
implement the strategy (25, F). If subjects let the time run down to 0, they entered the endgame, in
which they simultaneously decided between fight and flee (with no time constraints, as they decided
simultaneously anyway).
Our dynamic game has 50 periods, more than the minimum required to test the theoretical
predictions of the model, and short time intervals of 200 ms. Our goal was to have a design that is
closer to the examples that motivated our research. A disadvantage is that rational subjects might
find it hard to exactly implement equilibrium strategies in our setup. A follow-up experiment with
longer time-intervals addresses this concern (see section 4.4).
The static version of the game abstracted from the time element and only consisted of the
endgame of the dynamic version. That is, in this version of the game subjects were immediately
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Table 1: Overview of treatments
Treatment N subjects N matching groups
version deterrence value (k)
Dynamic -6 64 8
Dynamic 6 56 7
Dynamic 12 64 8
Static -6 56 7
Static 6 64 8
Static 12 56 7
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put in the same position as the players of the dynamic game who had both decided to wait until the
end of the game. So in the static game both subjects simultaneously chose between fight and flee.
After the main part, we obtained additional measurements. We assessed subjects’ risk aversion
using the method of Gächter et al. [2007]. A subject chooses whether to accept or reject 6 different
lotteries. In a lottery, the winning amount is 6 euros. The losing amount varies across lotteries,
from 2 till 7. In each lottery, the winning and the losing amount are equally likely. If a subject
rejects a lottery, she surely receives 0 euro. At the end of the experiment, 1 of the 6 lotteries is
selected at random and played out for actual payment. The number of rejected lotteries is our
measure of a subject’s degree of risk aversion.
We also measured physical strength. We asked subjects to press a hand dynamometer as hard
as they could, following the procedure of Sell et al. [2009]. This measurement was obtained twice,
and the best attempt was rewarded with 5 eurocents per kilo pushed. Finally, we obtained some
self-reported measurements on social dominance and prestige (taken from Cheng et al. [2010]),
perceived masculinity, sex, and age.4
This design allows us to investigate the predictions summarized in Propositions 1 and 2. In
addition, it makes it possible to test the predictions from the behavioral model of heterogeneous
risk aversion.
3.2 Procedures
The experiment was computerized and run at CREED (University of Amsterdam). The instructions
are in Appendix E. Subjects read the instructions at their own pace. They could only continue after
4Perceived masculinity is measured by the answer to the question: “On a scale from 1 (very
feminine) to 7 (very masculine), how would you describe yourself?”.
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correctly answering test questions at the end of the instructions. To ease understanding, we used
non-neutral labels such as ‘fight’ and ‘escape’. Subjects were informed that there would be two
parts, receiving new instructions at the start of each part.
During the experiment, subjects earned points, where 1 point = e0.70 (≈ $0.84). To avoid a
net loss at the end of the experiment, they received a starting capital of 21 points and any profits
or losses would be added to or subtracted from this. At the end of the experiment, one round of
the main part was randomly selected for payment. Total earnings averaged e19.09, ranging from
e5.30 to e38.20.5 A session took approximately 65-75 minutes.6
4 Results
In subsections 4.1 and 4.2 we will first consider the testable predictions following from Propo-
sitions 1and 2 respectively. Then, in subsection 4.3 we will turn to decisions at the individual level.
All statistical tests comparing treatment differences usematching group averages as the independent
unit of observation, unless indicated otherwise.
4.1 Timing of actions
Following Proposition 1, we address the comparative static prediction that the timing of actions
is influenced by the deterrence value. Specifically, we expect very quick decisions if the deterrence
value is negative and decisions in the final periods if the deterrence value is positive. Figure 2 shows
5The payment subjects received consisted of the starting capital and their earnings in the Fight-
or-Flight game, the lottery task, and the physical strength task.
6In addition to the 40 decision rounds (which lasted around 20 minutes), subjects spent time on
the instructions and test questions (25 minutes), the lottery task, questionnaire and physical strength



























Figure 2: Average waiting time (in ms) before subjects make a decision in the
dynamic game, by treatment and round. Lines are moving averages of 3 rounds.
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the average elapsed time before subjects made a decision in the dynamic games. As predicted, we
observe a clear effect of the deterrence value on the timing of actions. With a negative deterrence
value, subjects tend to fight or flee almost immediately. On average, subjects make a decision after
273 ms. When the deterrence value is positive, subjects tend to wait much longer. For k = 6, the
average elapsed time before making a decision is 3545 ms and for k = 12 this is 3973 ms. For both
treatments with a positive deterrence value, the average waiting time is significantly longer than for
k = −6 (Mann-Whitney tests, p = 0.001, N = 15 for k = −6 vs k = 6 and p < 0.001, N = 16 for
k = −6 vs k = 12). While subjects wait slightly longer when k = 12 than with k = 6, the difference
is not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.908, N = 15 for k = 6 vs k = 12). For
all three treatments we observe learning effects. When the deterrence value is positive, subjects
learn to wait, reflected by the strong positive time trend over the rounds. The reverse holds for the
negative deterrence value. In this case, subjects decide increasingly quicker. The average elapsed
time is 402 ms in the first 10 rounds and 200 ms in the final 10 rounds. When comparing the
average waiting times in the first 10 rounds and final 10 rounds, all time trends are statistically
significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p = 0.017, N = 8 for k = −6, p = 0.018, N = 7 for k = 6
and p = 0.017, N = 8 for k = 12).
Figure 3 gives amore detailed picture of the timing of decisions. The figure plots the distribution
of actions for each of the ten seconds plus the endgame (T). The left panels show this for the first 20
rounds and the right panels for the final 20 rounds. Several patterns emerge. First, with a negative
deterrence value, we clearly observe rushing: subjects decide almost immediately. None of the
matches make it to the endgame and 99.5 percent of all matches end in the first second. In fact, 90
percent of all matches end within the very first 200 ms, i.e. in the first period.7 With a positive















































































































Figure 3: Distribution of decisions over time (seconds) by deterrence value in the
dynamic game. Period “T” indicates the endgame. Left panels are for the first 20
rounds, right panels are for the final 20 rounds. Only observations where a player
made a decision to fight or flee are included in the graph, i.e. observations where
a player was waiting when the other moved are omitted.
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deterrence value, most action is at the very beginning and the very end: subjects tend to decide
either relatively quickly or wait until the final periods. In the final 20 rounds, a larger fraction
of subjects waits until the end. This fraction might be underestimated, because a subject who is
willing to wait until the end will only actually reach the end of the game if the paired player is also
willing to wait until then. Among those waiting, there are some subjects that flee right before the
endgame.
Result 1. When the deterrence value is negative, players act immediately. When the deterrence
value is positive, players are more likely to wait until the end of the game and they learn to wait
longer.
In contrast to the theoretical predictions, some subjects move at the very beginning of the game
when the deterrence value is positive. This fraction decreases over time, but even in the final 20
rounds (the right hand panels of Figure 3) we do observe such behavior. This behavior is not in line
with the timing equilibrium or waiting equilibrium. We return to this anomaly when we discuss
individual behavior (section 4.3). The comparative static results of increasing k are in line with the
theoretical predictions though.
4.2 Frequency of battles and sorting
The second main testable prediction -following from Proposition 2- is that endogenous timing
helps to avoid costly battles. Specifically, we expect fewer battles in the dynamic games in case
of a timing equilibrium, but not in case of a rushing or waiting equilibrium. The left panel of
Figure 4 shows the frequency of battles for each treatment (we discuss the results for Experiment
2 in subsection 4.4). We do indeed observe fewer battles in the dynamic treatments compared












































k = −6 k = 6 k = 12
 
static dynamic (exp. 1) dynamic (exp. 2)
Figure 4: Fraction of battles (left panel) and fraction of times that the weaker player
in a pair escapes (right panel). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, based
on matching groups as the independent unit of observation.
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deterrence value, and is always highly significant (p < 0.003 in each case, two-sidedMann-Whitney
tests). A regression analysis (Table A.1 in Appendix C, column 1) confirms that there are fewer
battles in the dynamic treatments, and this effect is slightly stronger when the deterrence value is
positive.
The reduction of battles for k = 6 is in line with the comparative static prediction following
from Proposition 2. For k = 6, the unique equilibrium outcome in the dynamic game is a timing
equilibrium, resulting in fewer battles than in the equilibrium of the static game. Even though we
observe deviations from the timing equilibrium (in particular, some subjects move at the beginning
of the game), we do find that the number of battles is reduced compared to the static case. The
observed lower frequency of battles for k = 12 is not expected if players are homogeneous in their
risk aversion, but is consistent with the comparative static prediction of our version of the model in
which players differ in their degree of risk aversion.8 In contrast to the theoretical predictions, we
also observe a decrease in battles when the deterrence value is negative. This result is, however,
partly mechanical; even if all subjects wanted to act immediately, some subjects might be a fraction
of a second slower than others, resulting in more escapes.9
It is also a possibility that random noise reduces the frequency of battles in the dynamic game.
8As for k = 6, we also observe deviations from a timing equilibrium when k = 12 as a number
of subjects move early on in the game. We discuss these deviations in more detail in subsection
4.3.
9Of the 15 percentage point difference in battles between static and dynamic games when
k = −6, 6 percentage points can be attributed to escapes that occur just because the subject who
wanted to fight is a fraction slower than the subject who wanted to flee. The remaining 9 percentage
points can be attributed to more subjects fighting in the static games.
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For instance, if players in the dynamic game choose fight, flee and wait in each period with equal
probabilities, while players in the static game choose between flee and fight with equal probabilities,
fewer battles will be observed in the static game.10 However, as we will illustrate in subsection 4.3,
the behavior of our subjects is very remote from this random benchmark. Our subjects respond
in a sensible way to their private strength parameters. Moreover, in agreement with theory but in
contrast to the random benchmark, we find that the dynamic nature matters most for reducing the
frequency of battles when k > 0.
Also following Proposition 2, we expect that players sort themselves according to their fighting
ability in case of a timing equilibrium. The strongest players should wait longer than weaker
players, giving weaker players the opportunity to escape. Hence, weaker players should manage
to escape more frequently in the dynamic games than the static games if the deterrence value is
positive. Our results are in line with this prediction. The right panel of Figure 4 shows how often
the weaker subject in a pair escapes. Subjects sort on fighting ability more often in the dynamic
than the static game and the increase is larger for dynamic games with a positive deterrence value.
For k = −6, the weaker player escapes in 12% of the matches in the static game and 26% of the
matches in the dynamic game. For k = 6 (k = 12), the weaker player escapes in 15% (18%) of the
matches in the static game and 38% (45%) of the matches in the dynamic game. The diff-in-diff
analysis reported in Table A.1 in Appendix C shows that the larger increase for positive deterrence
values is statistically significant.11
10We thank a referee for this insight.
11Figure A.2 in Appendix C shows decision times for weak and strong players separately. It
confirms the comparative static prediction that stronger subjects wait longer than weaker subjects
if the deterrence value is positive. Moreover, with experience, both weak and strong players learn
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Result 2. There are fewer battles in the dynamic game than in the static game. The dynamic version
of the game helps players to sort themselves according to their fighting ability, and this effect is
stronger when the deterrence value is positive.
The reduced number of battles in the dynamic games also positively affects earnings. Figure
5 shows the mean earnings for each treatment and for different levels of fighting ability. As
expected, stronger types attain higher earnings. Averaging across all fighting abilities, earnings
are higher in the dynamic games than in the static games (Mann-Whitney tests, p < 0.003 for all
three comparisons). Note that the difference for k = −6 is much smaller than the differences for
the treatments with a positive deterrence value. Moreover, for k = −6 the difference is driven by
weaker subjects whereas for the k > 0 treatments all types on average benefit from endogenous
timing.
4.3 Individual behavior
We start this subsection by considering how actions in the dynamic games depend on fighting
ability. Figure 6 plots the fraction of subjects who flee or fight before the endgame, those who
were waiting while the other moved, and those who wait until the endgame. We show this for the
different deterrence values and for different fighting ability levels (in 10 bins of equal size). In line
with the results on decision times discussed in subsection 4.1, no subject waits until the final period
when the deterrence value is negative. Only a few subjects (6 percent) are still waiting when the
other moves. When the deterrence value is positive, many subjects wait until the endgame, or are
waiting when the other moves. Combining those groups, we find that 44 percent of subjects (intend
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Figure 6: Behavior before the final period in the dynamic game, by deterrence
value k and fighting ability a (in 10 bins of equal size). The category “wait” are
subjects that made it to the endgame, and “other moves” are subjects who did not
make a move before the endgame but the other subject did.
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are much more likely to flee and stronger players are much more likely to wait or fight. This pattern
clearly shows that the behavior of subjects is far from a random benchmark.
In the Appendix we provide further details on individual strategies. In Appendix D we estimate
individual cutoff strategies. We find that most behavior is consistent with the use of cutoff strategies:
around 90 percent of all decisions are captured by individual cutoff strategies. There is substantial
heterogeneity in the type of cutoff strategies that individuals employ. Although the estimated cutoffs
organize the data very well, for a substantial number of subjects the estimated cutoffs are remote
from the theoretical prediction.
In subsection 4.2 we reported that sorting was not only observed for k = 6 but also for k = 12.
Although behavior in both treatments does not exactly follow the predictions from the timing
equilibrium (notably, some subjects move early on in the game), the finding that subjects sort in
k = 12 is consistent with the idea that heterogeneous risk aversion enlarges the set of environments
for which the timing equilibrium applies. A more direct implication of heterogeneous risk aversion
is that the more risk averse players should flee early more often. Table 2 presents panel data probit
regressions of how the probability of choosing to flee before the endgame (T) depends on a subject’s
level of risk aversion, together with some controls. In agreement with the model of heterogeneous
risk aversion, more risk averse subjects are more likely to flee before the endgame when k = −6
and when k = 12, and the effect survives when we combine all three treatments.12
An anomaly is the fighting behavior early on in the game when there are benefits of letting the
other escape, i.e. when k > 0. In this case, fighting early is weakly dominated. Given the observed
12When we regress the estimated cutoff fighting ability below which subjects flee before the
endgame on risk aversion and other individual characteristics, we obtain qualitatively similar
results. The regressions are reported in Table A.2 in Appendix C.
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Table 2: Fleeing before endgame
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k = −6 k = 6 k = 12 All k
Risk aversion 0.037∗∗∗ -0.001 0.041∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009)
Female -0.025 -0.012 0.003 -0.008
(0.031) (0.052) (0.060) (0.030)
Dominance 0.007 -0.028 -0.001 -0.006
(0.011) (0.023) (0.015) (0.010)
Physical strength -0.015 -0.004 0.003 -0.002
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.011)
Fighting ability -0.980∗∗∗ -0.881∗∗∗ -0.889∗∗∗ -0.935∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.034) (0.016) (0.013)
Round 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
k = 6 -0.127∗∗∗
(0.030)
k = 12 -0.112∗∗∗
(0.022)
Observations 2520 2080 2520 7120
Notes: Panel data probit regressions, with random effects at the subject level. Coefficients
are averagemarginal effects. Dependent variable is a dummy indicatingwhether the player
decided to flee before the endgame or not. Risk aversion is measured as the number of
rejected lotteries. Dominance and physical strength are normalized (mean 0 and s.d.
1). Fighting ability takes on values between 0 and 1. Standard errors (clustered at
the matching group level) in parentheses. Additional specifications with fewer or more
controls are reported in Table A.4 in Appendix C. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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actions in the experiment, the losses of fighting early are substantial. Consider the strongest possible
type who wins every fight. This type would earn 14 percent higher expected payoffs by waiting
to fight in the endgame if k = 6 and 42 percent higher expected payoffs if k = 12. Note that
fighting early is even more costly for weaker types. One possible reason for why we observe this
anomalous behavior is that subjects may need some time to learn. As Figure 3 shows, we do indeed
observe less of this behavior in the final 20 rounds compared to the first 20 rounds. Another,
more psychological, explanation for fighting early on in the game might be a preference for social
dominance. The evidence does not support this. Table 3 shows that the survey measure of social
dominance is not a predictor of fighting early. We also do not find an association with physical
strength, but we do find that women are more likely to fight early than men.13
It may be that some of our subjects start playing the game with a misguided behavioral rule
that in contests it generally pays off to strike first. Myerson [1991] proposes that behavior that is
apparently suboptimal behavior can sometimes be understood by assuming that observed behavior
is optimal in a related but more familiar environment, which he calls a ‘salient perturbation’ (see
Myerson [1991]; Samuelson [2001]; Jehiel [2005]). Alternatively, it could be that intuition favors
fighting behavior. According to the ‘social heuristics hypothesis’ (e.g., Rand et al. [2012, 2014])
applied to our setting, if fighting is typically advantageous, it could become the intuitive response.
Note that subjects who fight early on have limited opportunities to learn, since they never experience
the benefits of waiting. This could explain why they do not converge fully to waiting until the end
of the game.
13When we regress the estimated cutoff fighting ability above which subjects fight before the
endgame on risk aversion and other individual characteristics, we obtain qualitatively similar results.
The regressions are reported in Table A.3 in Appendix C.
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Table 3: Fighting in the first second
All rounds Final 20 rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
k = 6 k = 12 all k > 0 k = 6 k = 12 all k > 0
Risk aversion -0.030∗∗ -0.013 -0.020∗∗ -0.020 -0.015 -0.018∗
(0.015) (0.018) (0.010) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011)
Female 0.130 0.029 0.066 0.161 0.046 0.097∗∗
(0.100) (0.058) (0.050) (0.111) (0.049) (0.048)
Dominance 0.002 0.018 0.015 -0.025 0.011 0.006
(0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.021) (0.014) (0.011)
Physical strength 0.009 0.001 -0.001 0.025 0.022 0.022
(0.054) (0.036) (0.029) (0.053) (0.027) (0.025)
Fighting ability 0.415∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.060) (0.044) (0.072) (0.090) (0.048)
Round -0.004∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.003∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
k = 12 -0.017 -0.026
(0.042) (0.036)
Observations 2080 2520 4600 1040 1260 2300
Notes: Panel data probit regressions with random effects at the subject level. Coefficients
are average marginal effects. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the player
decided to fight in the first second or not. Risk aversion is measured as the number of rejected
lotteries. Dominance and physical strength are normalized (mean 0 and s.d. 1). Fighting
ability takes on values between 0 and 1. Standard errors (clustered at the matching group
level) in parentheses. Additional specifications with fewer or more controls are reported in
Table A.5 in Appendix C. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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The fact that we observe an approximately equal frequency of early battles when k = 6 as when
k = 12 suggests that this behavior is not due to a separate utility component reflecting (for instance)
a desire to control the outcome or a “joy of winning”. If people have a preference to control the
outcome, we would expect less early battles when it becomes more costly in k = 12.14 Still, when
play has not yet converged to equilibrium, we cannot exclude that early fighting is encouraged by
players who experience a “joy of winning” when they beat the other in a battle. In our follow-up
experiments reported in Section 4.4, we include some measures of joy of winning to get direct
evidence for this possibility.15
Result 3. A sizable minority of players acts immediately when the deterrence value is positive. This
behavior decreases with experience.
4.4 Experiment 2
In the dynamic treatments, a period lasted 200 ms. Such short periods can make it hard for
participants to precisely time their actions. This could potentially explain why even for k = −6
we observe fewer battles and more escapes in the dynamic game compared to the static game. We
address this in a follow-up experiment.16
14The same argumentation would apply to a distaste for surprise or suspense.
15Sheremeta [2010], Price and Sheremeta [2011] and Cason et al. [2018] all report evidence
that joy of winning and risk aversion are important factors in driving subjects’ behavior in contest
games. In a second price auction with value uncertainty, Goeree and Offerman [2003b] find that
bidders tend to submit bids below the expected value of the object, which suggests that risk aversion
may be the stronger force. Sheremeta [2013] provides a survey.
16We thank a referee for this suggestion.
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4.4.1 Experimental design and procedures
The design of Experiment 2 closely follows that of the first experiment. We collected data for
all dynamic treatments, using periods of 5 seconds instead of 200 ms, and 4 periods per round (with
40 rounds in total). This gives subjects more scope to time their actions. We also added two items
to the survey, measuring subjects’ “joy of winning”. The first (incentivized) measure is taken from
Sheremeta [2010, 2018]. In this task, subjects can bid to win a contest with a prize of 0 points.
For the second (non-incentivized) measure, subjects indicated how strongly they agreed with the
statement: “I enjoy winning an amount by competing against another person more than I enjoy
receiving that same amount without having to compete for it” (rated on a 7-point Likert scale).
The experiment was run online. Participants were recruited from the same subject pool as for
the first experiment (excluding subjects that already participated). As in the first experiment, we
included test questions at the end of the instructions. We showed the correct answers after two
failed attempts on a question. We did this to prevent that subjects would log out if they had to wait
for too long. We kept track of the mistakes they made, so that we can control for this in the analysis.
In total, 168 subjects participated, with 7 matching groups of 8 subjects in each of the three
dynamic treatments (k = −6, k = 6, k = 12).17 Sessions lasted around 60 minutes in total, and
earnings varied between e4.20 and e35.70 (e19.00 on average).
4.4.2 Results
Figure 7 shows the timing of actions, which strongly resembles the results of Experiment 1.
With a negative deterrence value, virtually all action happens in the first period. With a positive
17We have some missing data for 5 subjects who lost the connection. If a subject could not be
paired in a round because of this, he or she received the maximal payoff.
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deterrence value, many subjects wait until later periods. Compared to the first 20 rounds (left
panels), more subjects wait in the final 20 rounds (right panels). The mean waiting time does not
increase with experience for k = −6 and does increase for positive deterrence values (Figure A.3,
Appendix C). Moreover, we again observe that some participants act in the first period when k > 0.
In line with the theoretical predictions, some subjects flee just before the endgame, although some
do so in period 2 rather than period 3, and very few fight just before the endgame.
Figure 4 plots the frequency of battles and escapes by the weaker player in both experiments.
The results are very comparable to those of Experiment 1. In particular, for positive values of k,
the dynamic game leads to a reduction in battles and an increase in escapes by the weaker player
compared to the static version. The difference between the static and dynamic game is significant in
all those cases (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.005 in all cases). The main difference with Experiment 1
is that for a negative k, there is no reduction in battles or increase in escapes compared to the static
games (p = 0.898 for battles, p = 0.368 for escapes). This supports the idea that in Experiment
1 the decrease in battles and increase in escapes is driven by coordination failures: subjects may
have attempted to immediately fight but were not always able to precisely time their action.18
In Experiment 2, we again observe anomalous early fighting if k > 0. The two measures of
joy of winning do not explain this early fighting, while the number of mistakes in the test questions
and the social dominance score do explain (some) of the anomalous behavior (see Table A.7 in
Appendix C). In Experiment 2, we do not replicate the finding that risk aversion correlates with
18A regression analysis confirms these results. The interaction effects between dynamic timing
and positive deterrence values are statistically significant, indicating that the effect of dynamic















































































































Figure 7: Distribution of decisions over periods by deterrence value in the dynamic
game with 4 periods (Experiment 2). Left panels: first 20 rounds. Right panels:
final 20 rounds. Only observations where a player made a decision to fight or flee
are included (omitting observations where a player was waiting when the other
moved).
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fleeing before the endgame (see Table A.8 in Appendix C).19
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we present a dynamic Fight-or-Flight game that makes sense of a large range of
conflicts observed in practice. We highlight the crucial role that the deterrence value plays that
players receive when the other player successfully escapes. If it is negative, players will act in a
split-second. When it is positive, players will be patient and try to make the other player flee. An
interesting feature of the analysis is that if the deterrence value is positive but not too large, sorting
will occur. That is, the weakest players will flee just before the end, and thereby avoid costly battles.
Thus, this paper clarifies how time can help people reach better outcomes in dynamic games, even
when time is not costly. The important role of the deterrence value is confirmed in our experiments.
Compared to a static version of the game, players are better able to avoid costly battles.
In the experiment, we find support for a behavioral version of the model that allows for
heterogeneous risk aversion. In agreement with this model, sorting occurs for a wider range of
situations than predicted by the model with standard preferences. In addition, subjects who appear
to be more risk averse in an independent task tend to be the ones that more frequently flee early,
although we do not replicate this in the follow-up experiment. We also observe an interesting
anomaly. A fraction of the players choose to fight early even in situations where the strategic
incentive is to be patient. Our conjecture is that some subjects come to the interaction with a
homegrown notion that it generally pays off to strike early in contests. Over time, this costly
behavior diminishes but does not disappear.
19If we combine the data of both experiments, risk aversion is significantly correlated with fleeing
before the endgame, and dominance with early fighting. See Tables A.9 and A.10 in Appendix C.
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We think that our setup provides a lower limit of the amount of sorting that can be expected in
practice. In our game, players manage to sort even though they do not receive any sensory input
about the ability of the opponent. In particular when there is a strategic incentive to wait, sensory
cues before or during the contest may help players to avoid costly fights. In an actual display, body
odor or a high pitched voice may reveal fear and help identify the weaker player (Mujica-Parodi et
al. [2009], Sobin and Alpert [1999]). A dominant performance in a television show by a candidate
running for presidential office may convince a weaker opponent that it is better to flee early. In the
future, artificial intelligence may further help players to agree on how they are ranked in terms of
ability before they engage in a costly battle. Relevant information about the opponent’s ability will
also affect players’ decisions when the deterrence value is negative. However, in such situations a
positive frequency of battles cannot be avoided. Even when information about the opponent helps
players to perfectly forecast who will win the fight, the stronger player will still want to catch the
weaker player in a battle.
Costly time is another aspect that will encourage a higher proportion of weak types to flee
before the end. Also, with costs of time sorting will unfold more gradually, and the weakest types
will already flee at the start. We think that extending the analysis in these two directions provides
an interesting avenue for future research.
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A Proofs of Propositions
Let St be the set of feasible actions for a player at time t < T . If no player decided to fight or
flee at any t′ < t, then St = {W, F, R}, otherwise St is null. ST = {F, R}. Here, W indicates wait,
F indicates fight, and R indicates flee (retreat). The game ends with at least one player choosing F
or R. A pure strategy is then a mapping from each possible date t to St , conditional on the player’s
type. To ease notation, we denote a player’s strategy as si(ai) = (t, A), where A = {F, R}, meaning
that player i with ability ai will take an action (fight or flee) at time t if the other player did not fight
or flee before. In what follows, when we describe a strategy, we drop the qualifier "conditional on
the other player not fleeing or fighting before."
We first show that equilibrium strategies are monotonic, in the sense that if some type prefers
to fight at some point over fleeing at that or any other point, then all stronger types also prefer to
fight at some point over fleeing. Let Ṽi((t, A), ai, s j(a j)) be player i’s expected payoff of playing
strategy (t, A) given his type ai and strategy of the opponent (and distribution of possible types of
the opponent).
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity of Equilibrium Strategies). (i) If there is an equilibrium in which there is
a period t such that a player with type ai (strictly) prefers strategy (t, F) to (t′, R) for any t′, then
any player with type a j > ai (strictly) prefers (t, F) to (t′, R) for any t′. (ii) Suppose there is an
interval of types at = (a1, a2) that act in period t and let ai, a j ∈ at . If there is a type ai that is
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indifferent between (t, F) and (t, R), then all types a j > ai strictly prefer (t, F) to (t, R) and all types
a j < ai strictly prefer (t, R) to (t, F).
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider two types a′ and a′′ > a′. Suppose type a′ prefers (t, F) for some t to
(t′, R) for any t′. Then it must be that there exists a t such that for all t′,
∆(a′) ≡ Ṽi((t, F), a′, ·) − Ṽi((t′, R), a′, ·) ≥ 0. (8)
Fighting in period t instead of fleeing in period t′ never decreases and may increase the likelihood
of ending up in a battle with types a ∈ (a′, a′′). Type a′ would lose such a battle and type a′′ would
win it. If the opponent has ability a < (a′, a′′), then ∆(·) is affected equally for types a′ and a′′. The
likelihood of a battle by fighting at t instead of fleeing at t′ increases if (i) the opponent fights at t′
or after, or (ii) flees at t or after. If A is the set of types on (a′, a′′) that fights at t′ or after, or flees
at t or after, then,




where g(a) is the density function. Using the above fact, equation (8) implies:
∆(a′′) = Ṽi((t, F), a′′, ·) − Ṽi((t′, R), a′′, ·) ≥ 0. (9)
and the inequality in (9) is strict if either (8) holds with strict inequality or there is a strictly positive
mass of types acting at period t′ or after.
To show part (ii), note that in this case there is a strictly positive probability of meeting an
opponent with an ability between a j and ai, and ∆(a j) is therefore strictly higher than ∆(ai). 
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose −vh < k < 0. In this case, winning a battle yields a higher payoff
than letting the other escape. There exists a ε > 0 such that all types on (1 − ε, 1] strictly prefer
(0, F) to (t, R) for any t. For ε → 0, the likelihood of meeting a stronger type becomes arbitrarily
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small for types on that interval, and they win all battles with weaker types. Thus, sufficiently
strong types will never flee. In any equilibrium, there must also be a positive fraction of types with
strategy (t, R) for some t. If this were not the case, then there exists an ε > 0 such that all types
on [0, ε) strictly prefer (0, R) to (t, F) for any t. For ε → 0, the likelihood of meeting a stronger
type becomes arbitrarily high for types on that interval, and they lose all battles with stronger types.
Thus, sufficiently weak types would deviate to fleeing.
Now let t′ be the last period in which a positive fraction of types acts. Denote this set by
At ′ = {ai |si = (t′, R) ∪ si = (t′, F)}, and let at ′ = infAt ′ and āt ′ = supAt ′. In that period,
there must be a positive fraction of types with (t′, R) and a positive fraction of types with (t′, F).
If there would be no positive fraction of types fleeing, then for sufficiently small ε, all types on
At ′ ∩ [at ′, at ′ + ε) strictly gain by deviating to (t′, R): deviating to fleeing in that period strictly
decreases the probability of a battle which the sufficiently weak types in that set would almost
surely lose. If there would be no positive fraction of types fighting, then for sufficiently small ε, all
types on At ′ ∩ (āt ′ − ε, āt ′] strictly gain by deviating to (t′, F): deviating to fighting in that period
strictly increases the probability of a battle which the sufficiently strong types would almost surely
win.
With a positive fraction of types that has strategy (t′, R), there cannot be a period t < t′ in which
a positive fraction of types has strategy (t, R). If there were such a period (if there are more, let t be
the last of those), then Lemma 1 implies that types with strategy (t, R) must be weaker than types
with strategy (t′, F). But then types with strategy (t′, F) strictly gain by deviating to (t, F), since
this will not affect the outcome with other types that have strategy (t, F) and strictly decreases the
probability of an escape by types with strategy (t, R) (which are weaker).
It then follows that all types must act at t = 0. If there is some period t′ > 0 in which a positive
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fraction of types flees, then all types that fight gain by deviating to strategy (t, F) for some t < t′.
Since in any equilibrium in which a positive fraction of types has strategy (t′, R) there must also
be a positive fraction of types with strategy (t′, F), it must be that t′ = 0. The only equilibrium
strategies are then (0, R) and (0, F). Lemma 1 then implies that all types below a certain threshold
flee, and types above the threshold fight. The threshold is determined by equation (4) in the main
text. With these strategies, no player has an incentive to deviate. The equilibrium payoffs for types
ai < ã are ã 12 (vh + k) + (1 − ã)(1 − p)(−λvl). Fleeing or fighting in some period t > 0 would yield
payoffs ã(vh + k) + (1 − ã)(−λvl). No player deviates if ã ≤ pλvl/[12 (vh + k) + pλvl]. Substituting
for ã, we find that this is always satisfied. Types a j > ã clearly have no incentive to deviate to
acting later. Acting later does not change the outcomes with other types that fight and increases
the likelihood of the weaker types escaping. Finally, no type wishes to deviate to another strategy
at t = 0. The difference in payoffs between fighting and fleeing (∆) is strictly increasing for types
ai < ã (∂∆/∂ai = ã(1 − p)(vh + λvl)) and strictly increasing for ã < a j for any p > 0 and constant
for p = 0 (∂∆/∂a j = (1 − ã)p(vh + λvl)). Thus, if ã is indifferent, then all weaker types strictly
prefer to flee and all stronger types (weakly) prefer to fight.
The equilibrium exists for 0 < ã < 1. It is straightforward to verify that this is the case for any
−vh < k < 0.
Consider next the case with 0 < k < k̂. In this case, letting the other escape yields a higher
payoff than winning a battle. In equilibrium there has to be a positive fraction of types that for
some t prefers (t, R) to (t′, F) for any t′. If this were not the case, and no positive fraction flees at
some point, then for sufficiently small ε > 0, all types on [0, ε) strictly gain by fleeing at t = 0:
this would strictly increase the probability of an escape and they almost surely lose a battle for ε
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sufficiently small.
We next show that all types will act in the last two periods. Let t′ be the last period in which
a positive fraction flees. The strongest types strictly prefer to wait until after t′, if such a period
exists. It cannot be that a positive fraction fights after t′, however. If there would be a set of types
A f fighting after t′, with a = infA f , then for ε > 0 sufficiently small, types on A f ∩ [a, a + ε)
would strictly gain by fleeing in some period after t′. Thus, it must be the case that the strongest
types wait until T , and at least some of the types acting in period T will flee. No type will then
fight before T : fighting later does not change the outcome against other types that fight, and gives
weaker types the option to escape. Furthermore, no type will act before T − 1: if a positive fraction
of types would act before T − 1, they would strictly gain from waiting until T − 1, since no types
fight at T − 1. Lemma 1 implies that if some types fight at T , then all stronger types must fight too.
Any equilibrium can therefore be characterized by the thresholds in equation (5) in the main text.
Under these strategies, no type gains from deviating. All types [0, â2] have the same equilibrium
payoff (â1 12 (vh + k) > 0) and are indifferent between (T − 1, R), (T, R) and (T, F). If they would
flee before T − 1 they would earn 0. Fighting earlier is strictly dominated for type â2 since it would
give weaker types no option to escape, and therefore also for any weaker type. Types (â2, 1] earn
more under strategy (T, F) than under strategy (T, R), and they also do not want to act earlier, as it
would give weaker types no option to escape. If no player acts before T , players will update their
beliefs about the opponent’s type. With the threshold level â2, it is easy to show that type â2 is still
indifferent between fleeing and fighting, and all stronger (/weaker) types prefer to fight (/flee).
The equilibrium exists if 0 < â1 < â2 < 1. That 0 < â2 < 1 is clear from the restrictions on
k. After some rewriting, one can show that â1 < â2 if k < vh, which always holds for this case as
from equation (6) it follows that k < k̂ < vh.
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Finally, consider the case with k > k̂. The analysis is identical to the case for 0 < k < k̂, except
that ã1 is negative. This means that all types like to act at T . Weak types flee and strong types fight,
where the threshold is determined as ã as in equation (4). Note that for k(1 − 2p) > vh, all types
prefer to flee in equilibrium, so we set ã = 1.

Proof of Proposition 2. Part (i). In a simultaneous move game, the threshold type is determined by
ã. For the rushing and waiting equilibrium, this coincides with the threshold type in the dynamic
game and the frequency of battles must be the same in the dynamic and the static games. For the
timing equilibrium, a battle occurs when a player with ai > â2 either meets another player with
a j > â2 or another player with a j ∈ (â1, â2) who does not manage to escape. This means that the
frequency of battles in the timing equilibrium is given by f btiming = (1−â2)
2+2(1−â2)(â2−â1)(1−p).
In the static game, a battle occurs if two types with ai > ã meet, or when a type with ai > ã meets
a type with a j ≤ ã and the weaker type does not manage to escape. This is, the frequency
of battles in the static game is given by f bstatic = (1 − ã)
2 + 2(1 − ã)ã(1 − p). A sufficient
condition for fewer battles to occur in the timing equilibrium than in the static game (i.e. for
f bstatic > f
b




is satisfied whenever a timing equilibrium exists. Part (ii) In the static game, the weaker player
in a pair manages to escape with frequency f sstatic = ã
(
ã 12 + (1 − ã)p
)
+ (1 − ã) (ãp). In the
dynamic games, this frequency is the same in case of a rushing or waiting equilibrium. In
case of a timing equilibrium, the weaker player in a pair manages to escape with frequency
f stiming = â1
(
â1 12 + (1 − â1)
)
+ (â2 − â1)
(
â1 + (â2 − â1)12 + (1 − â2)p
)
+ (1− â2) (â1 + (â2 − â1)p).
In the proof of part (i), we showed that if a timing equilibrium exists, it must be that ã < â2.
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This implies that f sstatic < â2
(
â2 12 + (1 − â2)p
)
+ (1 − â2) (â2p) and a sufficient condition for
f stiming > f
s




â2 12 + (1 − â2)p
)
+ (1 − â2) (â2p) to hold. Rewriting yields that
this holds as long as â1 + â2 + (1− â2)2p < 2, which is satisfied as in a timing equilibrium we have
that â1 < â2 < 1 and p ≤ 12 . 
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B Extensions
B.1 Uncertainty in the likelihood of winning a battle
In the model, we assume that the stronger player always wins a battle. In many cases, there is
some uncertainty and weaker players sometimes win battles too. A natural case is one in which the
likelihood of winning a battle increases in a player’s relative ability compared to the opponent. For
instance, the probability that i wins a battle may be determined by:
eµai
eµai + eµaj
, µ > 0 (10)
so that stronger types are more likely to win, and types of similar fighting ability have about equal
chances of winning.
For large values of µ, such functions will yield the same qualitative results. That is, with positive
deterrence value, all the action will be concentrated in the final two periods. The strongest types
will still want to fight in the final period, while no type will want to flee before the penultimate
period. Likewise, with a negative deterrence value, all types will still act immediately, provided
the strongest types prefer to fight. Naturally, the exact thresholds ã, â1, â2 and k̂ will depend on the
specifics of the winning function. Stronger types still have more to gain from fighting than weaker
types, but the difference decreases. This time, the equilibrium outcome does not only pin down the
fraction of types fleeing in the penultimate period, but also the set of types. In the basic setup, all
types below ã2 were certain to lose a battle and therefore all had the same payoffs of fleeing and
fighting. With a probabilistic chance of losing a battle that depends on relative fighting ability, the
weakest types are most likely to lose a battle, and therefore they are the ones fleeing at T − 1.
For small values of µ, other types of equilibria exist. As µ becomes small, there is more
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randomness in which player wins a battle. In the extreme case, where µ ≈ 0, each type has an
almost equal chance of winning a battle against any other type. In that case, there can be equilibria
where all types prefer to fight (whenever 12 (vh − λvl) > 0), possibly at different periods. There can
also be an equilibrium in which all types prefer to flee in the last period (when 12 (vh − λvl) < 0).
B.2 Discounting
Another natural extension is to introduce discounting of future payoffs. We assume that a payoff
that is received τ periods from some date t is discounted by δτ, evaluated at date t. Here, δ ∈ (0, 1].
To make things interesting, we assume that any payoffs are realized as soon as at least one of the
players acts.20
In the following, we show that for δ exceeding some critical level δ∗ < 1, the equilibrium
outcomes characterized in Proposition 1 continue to exist (with some proper adjustments of the
threshold levels â1 and â2). That is, for δ sufficiently close to 1, there exist a rushing equilibrium
when k < 0, a timing equilibrium when 0 < k < k̂ and a waiting equilibrium when k > min(0, k̂).
Rushing equilibrium. For k < 0, this equilibrium profile, in which all types act immediately,
is trivially unaffected by δ; if a type has no incentive to deviate to fight or flee in a later period for
δ = 1, then the type certainly has no incentive to deviate for any δ < 1. The threshold level ã is
also unaffected. It is also still the case that this equilibrium does not exist for k > 0 when δ < 1.
If all types would act immediately, the strongest type would gain from acting later; since all other
types are supposed to act in period 0, this does not affect the outcome if the opponent fights (which
then still happens in period 0), but gives weak opponents the chance to flee.
Timing equilibrium. In the timing equilibrium without discounting, all the action happens in
20If all payoffs are realized at T or later, discounting just implies a rescaling of the payoffs.
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the penultimate and last period. If the equilibrium exists for δ < 1, the new thresholds â′1 and â
′
2
will depend on the discount factor, as type a = â′1 must be indifferent between fleeing in period
T − 1 and fleeing one period later. For any type, the payoff of fleeing at T − 1 is (evaluated at
t = 0):21
δT−1 12 (v
h + k)â′1. (11)
For any type a ≤ â′2, the expected payoff of fleeing at T (again evaluated at t = 0) is:
â′1δ
T−1(vh + k) + (â′2 − â′1)δT 12 (v
h + k) + (1 − â′2)δT (1 − p)(−λvl). (12)
For type a = â′2, the expected payoff of fighting at T is (again evaluated at t = 0):
â′1δ
T−1(vh + k) + (â′2 − â′1)δT (vh + pk) + (1 − â′2)δT (−λvl), (13)
Using (11), (12) and (13), and given that type a = â′1 must be indifferent between fleeing at T − 1
and T , and type a = â′2 must be indifferent between fleeing in period T and fighting in period T ,
gives:
â′1 =
((1 − 2p)(vh − k) − 2p2k)λvlδ







((1 − 2p)(vh − k) − 2p2k)λvlδ + pλvl(vh + k)





while k̂ = 1−2p
1−2p+2p2 v
h remains as in (6).
To consider whether this timing equilibrium profile can be sustained with discounting, note that
the most profitable deviation before T − 1 is to take some action at t = 0 (rather than for some
21Aswe assume exponential discounting, the analysis is unaffected by the period at which (future)
payoffs are evaluated.
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0 < t < T − 1). A deviation to fleeing at t = 0 is never profitable as it gives a payoff of zero instead
of a positive discounted payoff. On the other hand, some types will have positive expected payoffs
of fighting at t = 0. All types that fight will gain or lose the same from deviating to t = 0 when
they are paired with a type that flees. However, when paired with another type that fights, weaker
types have a larger probability of losing a battle, and by deviating to t = 0 they incur any losses
−vl earlier on (and thus discounted less), making it less attractive to deviate compared to stronger
types. Hence, of all the types that fight at T , type a = 1 has the most to gain from fighting at an
earlier date.
Type a = 1 prefers not to deviate to fighting at t = 0 as long as
â′1δ
T−1(vh + k) + (â′2 − â′1)δT (vh + pk) + (1 − â′2)δTvh ≥ vh, (16)
and not to deviate to fighting at t = T − 1 as long as
â′1δ
T−1(vh + k) + (â′2 − â′1)δT (vh + pk) + (1 − â′2)δTvh ≥ δT−1(vh + â′1pk). (17)
At δ = 1, the inequalities in (16) and (17) are strict. The LHS of (16) and both sides of (17) are
clearly continuous in δ, so that there exists δ∗ < 1 such that (16) and (17) hold for any δ > δ∗.
Note also that there cannot be an equilibrium in pure strategies in which all players act before
T . In that case, in the last period in which a positive fraction of types act, the strongest type would
strictly prefer to deviate to fight at a later period (this would not change the period in which payoffs
are realized, gives types that flee a higher chance to escape, and does not change the outcome if the
opponent fights).
Waiting equilibrium. As for the rushing equilibrium, the threshold ã in (4) is unaffected by
discounting. In the waiting equilibrium, the highest type has again the strongest incentive to deviate
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to fight in period 0 (and deviating to fleeing in an earlier period is never profitable for any type).
The strongest type has no incentive to deviate to fight at t = 0 as long as:
ãδT (vh + pk) + (1 − ã)δTvh ≥ vh. (18)





should hold for the waiting equilibrium to exist, and note
that [vh/(vh + ãpk)]1/T < 1.
Given that all equilibrium outcomes as described in Proposition 1 still exists for sufficiently
large discount factors, the results in Proposition 2 remain valid as well. In particular, compared
to the static case, a timing equilibrium results in fewer battles and weaker players are more likely
to escape. In this case, whether the dynamic version improves welfare is less clear-cut, as the
reduction in battles comes at the cost of waiting longer.
B.3 Cost of waiting
A variant that yields somewhat different predictions is the one where players face the same
known cost c for time. Here, it may happen that weak players decide to drop out earlier than the
penultimate period, as illustrated in the following example. Consider the case in which T = 2,
k = 10, p = 1/2, and λ = 1, while players incur a waiting cost of c = 5 per period. Then it is
straightforward to show that there is an equilibrium where low types with abilities in the interval
[0, 3/13] do not wait and flee immediately at t = 0, types in (3/13, 5/13] flee at t = 1, types in
(5/13, 9/13] flee at t = 2 while types in (9/13, 1] fight at t = 2. Thus, with a cost of waiting, a more
gradual fleeing of types may be observed in equilibrium.
B.4 Continuous time
With continuous time, the ‘Rushing’ and ‘Waiting’ equilibria described in Proposition 1 remain
unaffected. When the deterrence value is negative players still want to move immediately and when
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the deterrence value is sufficiently large all players will still move as late as possible. However,
when the deterrence value is positive but not too large (as in part (ii) of Proposition 1), there would
be no equilibrium in pure strategies in a continuous time model due to an open-set problem. In the
‘timing equilibrium’ with discrete time, the weakest types flee just before the end. In a continuous
time model, if the weakest types with abilities [0, a∗1] flee in some period T − ε, then any type in
this interval would like to deviate and flee in T − 12ε, however small ε is chosen. This also holds in
the ‘Perfectly Continuous time’ protocol that is discussed in Calford and Oprea [2017] and Simon
and Stinchcombe [1989].22 Calford and Oprea [2017] show that behavior in experiments can be
closer to either ‘Perfectly Continuous time’ or ‘Perfectly Discrete time’ equilibria, depending on
the magnitude of players’ inertia.
Our experimental implementation involves discrete time with short (200 ms) periods. We
conjecture that under ‘Perfectly Continuous time’, behavior will be very close to the behavior that
we observe in our current experiments. Although the periods are short, most of the actions are
predicted to be made at the start of (very near) the end of the game, so that it should still be relatively
easy for participants to time their decisions to flee or fight (a prediction that is supported by the
data).
22For further discussion about when discrete time can be more appropriate to model timing in
games, see Fudenberg and Tirole [1985] and Levin and Peck [2003].
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Figure A.1: Distribution of decisions over time periods by deterrence value in the
dynamic game. Each period is a 200 ms interval, period “T” is the endgame. First,
third and fifth panel are for the first 20 rounds, second, fourth and sixth panel are









































































Figure A.2: Average waiting time (in ms) before subjects make a decision in the
dynamic game, by treatment, type and round. 3-round moving average. Strong
























Figure A.3: Average waiting time (in periods) before subjects make a decision in
the dynamic games of Experiment 2, by treatment and round. Lines are moving
averages of 3 rounds.
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Table A.1: Treatment differences in battles and sorting
(1) (2)
Battle occurs Weaker escapes
k = 6 -0.046 0.025
(0.039) (0.028)




k = 6 × Dynamic -0.073 0.088∗∗
(0.055) (0.040)






Notes: OLS regressions. Unit of observation is a matching group. Dependent variable
in column (1) is the fraction of battles and in column (2) the fraction of matches where
the weaker player in a pair managed to escape. All independent variables are dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.2: Fleeing before endgame: based on estimated cutoff strategies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k = −6 k = 6 k = 12 All k
Risk aversion 31.31∗ 25.46 45.72∗ 32.70∗∗∗
(13.30) (21.43) (20.52) (10.45)
Female -12.17 41.74 2.89 2.38
(49.33) (80.05) (89.27) (42.01)
Dominance 12.41 -36.85 13.73 3.45
(18.08) (24.82) (15.70) (11.91)
Physical strength -5.11 29.30 -7.30 0.70
(28.27) (27.13) (22.56) (14.91)
k = 6 -130.56∗∗∗
(30.53)
k = 12 -91.55∗∗∗
(29.65)
Constant 321.36∗∗∗ 182.48∗∗ 188.89∗∗∗ 312.51∗∗∗
(28.87) (62.62) (27.25) (27.83)
Observations 63 52 63 178
R2 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.15
Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the estimated cutoff c1, indicating the
estimated strength below which a subject flees before the endgame (see Appendix D).
Risk aversion is measured as the number of rejected lotteries. Dominance and physical
strength are normalized to mean zero and a standard deviation of 1. Standard errors
(clustered at the matching group level) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Table A.3: Fighting before endgame: based on estimated cutoff strategies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k = −6 k = 6 k = 12 All k
Risk aversion 19.80 1.71 -6.16 7.04
(15.25) (31.26) (28.92) (13.78)
Female 5.33 -171.23 -129.28 -92.85∗
(38.33) (116.98) (72.43) (49.28)
Dominance 0.06 18.68 -44.17 -17.64
(13.74) (27.39) (26.41) (14.96)
Physical strength 12.95 -35.97 -34.43 -15.66
(28.69) (51.76) (48.05) (26.51)
k = 6 320.95∗∗∗
(52.20)
k = 12 342.10∗∗∗
(49.86)
Constant 394.30∗∗∗ 835.61∗∗∗ 853.71∗∗∗ 461.10∗∗∗
(36.68) (94.89) (70.72) (35.82)
Observations 63 52 63 178
R2 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.34
Notes: Linear regressions. Dependent variable is the estimated cutoff c3, indicating the
estimated strength above which a subject fights before the endgame (see Appendix D).
Risk aversion is measured as the number of rejected lotteries. Dominance and physical
strength are normalized to mean zero and a standard deviation of 1. Standard errors
(clustered at the matching group level) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Table A.4: Fleeing before endgame: including fewer or more controls
(1) (2) (3)
All k All k All k












Fighting ability -0.935∗∗∗ -0.931∗∗∗ -0.935∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Round -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
k = 6 -0.127∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
k = 12 -0.112∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 7120 7360 7040
Notes: Panel data probit regressions, with random effects at the subject level. Reported
are average marginal effects. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the
player decided to flee before the endgame or not. Risk aversion is measured as the
number of rejected lotteries. Dominance, physical strength, prestige and masculinity are
normalized to mean zero and a standard deviation of 1. Fighting ability takes on values
between 0 and 1. Standard errors (clustered at the matching group level) in parentheses.
For reference, column (1) is identical to column (4) in Table 2. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Fighting in the first second: including fewer or more controls
(1) (2) (3)
All k > 0 All k > 0 All k > 0




Dominance 0.006 0.004 0.004
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011)






Fighting ability 0.242∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.051) (0.050)
Round -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
k = 12 -0.026 -0.026 -0.022
(0.036) (0.031) (0.037)
Observations 2300 2320 2280
Notes: Panel data probit regressions, with random effects at the subject level. Reported
are average marginal effects. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the
player decided to fight in the first second or not. Risk aversion is measured as the
number of rejected lotteries. Dominance, physical strength, prestige and masculinity are
normalized to mean zero and a standard deviation of 1. Fighting ability takes on values
between 0 and 1. Standard errors (clustered at the matching group level) in parentheses.
For reference, column (1) is identical to column (6) in Table 3. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Treatment differences in battles and sorting (Experiment 2)
(1) (2)
Battle occurs Weaker escapes
k = 6 -0.046 0.025
(0.036) (0.027)




k = 6 × Dynamic -0.186∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.040)






Notes: OLS regressions. Unit of observation is a matching group. Dependent variable
in column (1) is the fraction of battles and in column (2) the fraction of matches where
the weaker player in a pair managed to escape. Based on data from the static treatments
(Experiment 1) and the dynamic treatments of Experiment 2. All independent variables
are dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.7: Fighting in the first period (Experiment 2)
All rounds Final 20 rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
k = 6 k = 12 all k > 0 k = 6 k = 12 all k > 0
Risk aversion 0.040∗∗∗ 0.015 0.022∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.005 0.012
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013)
Female -0.083∗∗∗ 0.063 -0.007 -0.048∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.032
(0.031) (0.052) (0.035) (0.026) (0.055) (0.032)
Dominance 0.041∗∗∗ -0.017 0.015 0.041∗∗∗ 0.012 0.027∗∗
(0.013) (0.024) (0.017) (0.009) (0.020) (0.012)
Joy of winning (incentivized) 0.011 0.028 0.015 0.018∗ 0.022 0.013
(0.008) (0.022) (0.014) (0.010) (0.018) (0.010)
Joy of winning (self-report) 0.009 0.030 0.013 -0.001 0.024 0.007
(0.011) (0.027) (0.014) (0.005) (0.020) (0.009)
Mistakes instr. 0.018∗∗∗ 0.009 0.014∗∗ 0.010 0.011 0.012∗∗
(0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Fighting ability 0.428∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.073) (0.061) (0.071) (0.089) (0.059)
Round -0.007∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.003 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
k = 12 0.037 0.065
(0.051) (0.047)
Observations 2160 2120 4280 1080 1060 2140
Notes: Panel data probit regressions, with random effects at the subject level. Reported
are average marginal effects. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the player
decided to fight in the first period or not. Risk aversion is measured as the number of rejected
lotteries. Dominance and self-reported joy of winning are normalized to mean zero and a
standard deviation of 1. Joy of winning is measured as the amount of points invested in a
contest for a prize of 0 points. Fighting ability takes on values between 0 and 1. Standard
errors (clustered at the matching group level) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Table A.8: Fleeing before endgame (Experiment 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k = −6 k = 6 k = 12 All k
Risk aversion 0.008 0.023 0.004 0.007
(0.010) (0.016) (0.014) (0.009)
Female 0.034 -0.030 0.117∗∗ 0.053
(0.073) (0.044) (0.055) (0.038)
Dominance -0.024 0.018 0.011 0.002
(0.018) (0.024) (0.016) (0.012)
Joy of winning -0.003 0.023 -0.034∗∗∗ -0.010
(0.013) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009)
Joy of winning (self-report) 0.010 0.017∗∗ 0.000 0.009
(0.021) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
Mistakes instr. 0.013 -0.013 -0.009 -0.001
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
Fighting ability -0.919∗∗∗ -0.817∗∗∗ -0.817∗∗∗ -0.850∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.038) (0.036) (0.021)
Round -0.002 -0.002 -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
k = 6 -0.028
(0.034)
k = 12 -0.011
(0.029)
Observations 1885 2160 2120 6165
Notes: Panel data probit regressions, with random effects at the subject level. Reported
are average marginal effects. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the
player decided to flee before the endgame or not. Risk aversion is measured as the
number of rejected lotteries. Dominance and self-reported joy of winning are normalized
to mean zero and a standard deviation of 1. Joy of winning is measured as the amount
of points invested in a contest for a prize of 0 points. Fighting ability takes on values
between 0 and 1. Standard errors (clustered at the matching group level) in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.9: Fighting early in the game (Experiments 1 and 2 combined)
(1) (2) (3)
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Both exp.
Risk aversion -0.016∗ 0.005 -0.007
(0.009) (0.013) (0.008)
Female 0.064∗∗ 0.036 0.053∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.030) (0.019)
Dominance 0.007 0.032∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008)
Fighting ability 0.241∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.058) (0.038)
Round -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)




Observations 2300 2140 4440
Notes: Panel data probit regressions, with random effects at the subject level. Reported
are average marginal effects. Based on the final 20 rounds of the dynamic games where
k > 0. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the player decided to fight in
the first second (Experiment 1) or first period (Experiment 2). Risk aversion is measured
as the number of rejected lotteries. Dominance is normalized to mean zero and a standard
deviation of 1. Fighting ability takes on values between 0 and 1. Standard errors (clustered
at the matching group level) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.10: Fleeing before endgame (Experiments 1 and 2 combined)
(1) (2) (3)
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Both exp.
Risk aversion 0.025∗∗∗ 0.008 0.017∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
Female -0.004 0.047 0.014
(0.018) (0.036) (0.019)
Dominance -0.006 0.000 -0.005
(0.009) (0.012) (0.008)
Fighting ability -0.935∗∗∗ -0.849∗∗∗ -0.897∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.020) (0.012)
Round -0.000 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
k = 6 -0.127∗∗∗ -0.026 -0.083∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.033) (0.023)




Observations 7120 6165 13285
Notes: Panel data probit regressions, with randomeffects at the subject level. Reported are
average marginal effects. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the player
decided to flee before the endgame or not. Risk aversion is measured as the number of
rejected lotteries. Dominance is normalized to mean zero and a standard deviation of
1. Fighting ability takes on values between 0 and 1. Standard errors (clustered at the
matching group level) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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D Individual cutoffs
In this appendix, we estimate cutoff strategies at the individual level. We use a grid search (with
intervals of 2 ‘fighting ability points’) to find a combination of cutoffs that maximizes the number
of accurately classified observed actions. In the exercise, we assume the following cutoff strategies.
For each individual, we estimate three cutoffs c1, c2 and c3, where 0 ≤ c1 ≤ c2 ≤ c3 ≤ 1000. Figure
A.4 shows the assumed cutoff strategies. We assume that individuals flee before the endgame if
they draw a fighting ability ai < c1, they wait until the endgame and then flee if c1 ≤ ai ≤ c2,
they wait until the endgame and then fight if c2 < ai ≤ c3 and fight before the endgame if c3 < ai.
These assumptions nest the risk-neutral equilibrium cutoff strategies. Moreover, the assumed cutoff
strategies are in line with how subjects (on average) base their actions on their fighting ability (see
Figure 6).
𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ
0 1000𝑐1 𝑐2 𝑐3
𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡 < 𝑇 𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡 = 𝑇 𝑓𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑡 = 𝑇 𝑓𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑡 < 𝑇
Figure A.4: Assumed cutoff strategies for the empirical model.
Figure A.5 shows the estimated cutoffs c1 and c3. Because of the learning effects we observe, we
base the estimates on the final 20 rounds of the experiment. Note that below c1 subjects should flee
before the endgame, between c1 and c3 they wait until the endgame, and above c3 they fight before
the endgame. This means that those in the top-left corner (c1, c3) = (0, 1000) always wait until the
endgame, those in the top-right corner (c1, c3) = (1000, 1000) always flee before the endgame and
those in the bottom-left corner (c1, c3) = (0, 0) always fight before the endgame. Those on the 45
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Figure A.5: Estimated individual cutoffs (Experiment 1), based on the final 20
rounds. Open circles represent individual estimates, the solid (orange) circle
represents the theoretical prediction assuming risk neutrality.
The left panel of Figure A.5 shows the estimates for k = −6. In this case, rushing is predicted
and under risk neutrality c1 = c3 ≈ 119. Qualitatively, the results are in line with this prediction.
For most subjects, we estimate a cutoff strategy with c1 ≈ c3 as most circles lie on the 45 degree line
or very close to it. In contrast to the risk neutral prediction, most estimated cutoffs lie somewhat
higher on the 45 degree line than predicted, meaning that subjects flee more often. Of course, this
is in line with subjects being risk averse.
The middle and right panel of Figure A.5 show the estimates for positive deterrence values. In
these cases, fighting before the endgame is weakly dominated and c3 = 1000 in equilibrium. In line
with these predictions, we see that most estimates lie close to c3 = 1000. There is heterogeneity
though, andwe observe a substantial number of estimates that remote from the theoretical prediction.
For some subjects, the estimates lie on the 45 degree line, indicating that those subjects never wait
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Table A.11: Estimated cutoffs (Experiment 1)
Treatment Mean cutoff Correctly classified c1 = c3
c1 c2 c3
Dynamic k = −6 393 393 444 0.96 0.78
Dynamic k = 6 256 359 750 0.88 0.21
Dynamic k = 12 304 430 780 0.88 0.16
until the endgame. For 21 percent of the subjects in k = 6 we estimate c1 = c3 while this is 16
percent for k = 12.
Table A.11 summarizes the estimation results. Besides the estimated average individual cutoffs,
the table also lists what fraction of observed actions are correctly classified by the estimated cutoff
strategies. The cutoff strategies capture observed behavior very well: between 88 and 96 percent
of all actions are correctly classified.
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E Instructions
The experimental instructions are reproduced below. All treatment dependent text is given in
italics, preceded by the relevant treatment variable(s) between braces. In the quiz questions, all
numbers (strengths, seconds) were generated randomly for each subject.23
E.1 Experiment 1
Welcome!
Welcome to this experiment on decision-making. Please read the following instructions care-
fully. You will also receive a handout with a summary. If you have any questions at any time,
please raise your hand. An experimenter will assist you privately.
Today’s experiment consists of 2 parts. At the beginning of each part, you will receive new
instructions. You will spendmost time on the first part. Your decisions in one part have no influence
on the proceedings or earnings of the other part.
Your decisions and those of other participants will determine your earnings. Your earnings will
be paid to you privately at the end of today’s session. All your earnings will be denoted in points.
At the end of the experiment, each point that you earned will be exchanged for 70 eurocents.
You will be given a starting capital of 21 points. Any profits or losses you make today will be
added to or subtracted from this starting capital.
Part 1: Decisions and Payoffs
This part consists of 40 rounds. In each round you will be randomly paired with another par-
23Icons used in the instructions are made by Freepik from www.flaticon.com.
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ticipant in the laboratory. Therefore, in each round you will (most likely) be paired with a different
participant than in the previous round. You will never learn with whom you are paired. At the
end of the experiment, one of the rounds of Part 1 will be randomly selected for payment. Your
earnings for Part 1 will be completely determined by what happened in this round.
Description of the situation and possible earnings
In each round, there is a prize of 10 points to get for one of you. If a Fight occurs between you
and the other participant, the strongest participant will earn the prize of 10 points and the weaker
participant will lose 10 points.
{k = −6} Each of you can also try to avoid a fight by attempting to flight. If a participant
manages to flight, there is No Fight, and the participant who flights guarantees him- or herself 0
points (instead of winning or losing 10 points depending on his or her strength). The participant
that did not flight then automatically receives the prize of 10 points minus a cost of 6 points because
he or she let the other get away (thus earning 4 points in total).
{k = 6} Each of you can also try to avoid a fight by attempting to flight. If a participant
manages to flight, there is No Fight, and the participant who flights guarantees him- or herself 0
points (instead of winning or losing 10 points depending on his or her strength). The participant
that did not flight then automatically receives the prize of 10 points plus an additional 6 points
because he or she did not have to fight for the prize (thus earning 16 in total).
{k = 12} Each of you can also try to avoid a fight by attempting to flight. If a participant
manages to flight, there is No Fight, and the participant who flights guarantees him- or herself 0
points (instead of winning or losing 10 points depending on his or her strength). The participant
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that did not flight then automatically receives the prize of 10 points plus an additional 12 points
because he or she did not have to fight for the prize (thus earning 22 in total).
{dynamic, k = −6} If both of you flight at the same time, it will be randomly determined who
wins the prize at a cost and who flights. So one of you will earn 4 points and the other will earn 0
points, and each possibility is equally likely.
{dynamic, k = 6} If both of you flight at the same time, it will be randomly determined who
wins the prize together with the bonus and who flights. So one of you will earn 16 points and the
other will earn 0 points, and each possibility is equally likely.
{dynamic, k = 12} If both of you flight at the same time, it will be randomly determined who
wins the prize together with the bonus and who flights. So one of you will earn 22 points and the
other will earn 0 points, and each possibility is equally likely.
{static, k = −6} If both of you attempt to flight, it will be randomly determined who wins the
prize at a cost and who flights. So one of you will earn 4 points and the other will earn 0 points,
and each possibility is equally likely.
{static, k = 6} If both of you attempt to flight, it will be randomly determined who wins the
prize together with the bonus and who flights. So one of you will earn 16 points and the other will
earn 0 points, and each possibility is equally likely.
{static, k = 12} If both of you attempt to flight, it will be randomly determined who wins the
prize together with the bonus and who flights. So one of you will earn 22 points and the other will
earn 0 points, and each possibility is equally likely.
When will a fight occur?
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{dynamic} In each round, there will be a clock that counts down from 10 seconds to 0. At any
point during this countdown, you and the other participant have the option to choose fight or flight.
You have also the option to wait and thereby postpone your decision. The computer checks every
fifth of a second if a decision has been made by one or both of you.
{static} In each round, you and the other participant have the option to choose fight or flight.
You will make this decision simultaneously with the other participant, without knowing what the
other participant chooses.
{dynamic} If both of you decided to fight, or one of you decided to fight while the other is still
waiting to make a decision, a Fight occurs.
{static} If both of you decided to fight, a Fight occurs.
{dynamic} If both of you decided to flight, or one of you decided to flight while the other is still
waiting to make a decision, there is No Fight.
{static} If both of you decided to flight, there is No Fight.
{dynamic} If one of you decided to flight at the same time that the other decided to fight, a fight
occurs 90% of the time. In the other 10% of the time, the person deciding to flight manages to
avoid a fight. So on average, the person that attempts to flight will get away 1 out of 10 times that
you end up in such a scenario.
{static} If one of you decided to flight and the other decided to fight, a fight occurs 90% of the
time. In the other 10% of the time, the person deciding to flight manages to avoid a fight. So on
average, the person that attempts to flight will get away 1 out of 10 times that you end up in such a
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scenario.
The possible scenarios are illustrated in the figure below.
{dynamic}
{static}
{dynamic} What will happen if both of you waited until 10 seconds have passed?
{dynamic} It is possible that after 10 seconds none of you has made a decision to fight or
flight. In that case, you are forced to make a decision to fight or flight. You will make this decision
simultaneously with the other participant, without knowing what the other participant chooses.
Your decision together with the decision of the other participant will then determine whether or not
a Fight occurs, according to the same rules as above.
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Part 1: Strength and Information
Strength
At the start of each round, each participant will be informed of her or his strength in that round.
• A participant’s strength will be a random number between 0 and 1000 (0 and 1000 are also
possible). Each of these numbers is equally likely.
• In each round, every participant is assigned a new (and independent) strength. Therefore,
the different participants (most likely) have different strengths in a round, and the same
participant (most likely) has different strengths across rounds.
• At the start of a round, each participant is only informed about her or his own strength.
• It is very unlikely that both players have the same strength, but if this happens it will be
randomly determined who is the stronger player.
Information at the end of a round
At the end of a round, each participant will be informed of the outcome, the other participant’s
strength and the resulting payoffs.
On the next screen you will be asked to answer some control questions. Please answer these
questions now.
Decision screen
Below you can test how the decision screen works. You can do this by clicking on "show
example" below. You can do this as many times as you like by clicking on "show example" again.
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If you understand the screen, click on "go to practice questions" to continue.
Practice questions
Please answer the following questions:
In each round, you are matched with:
The same participant
A randomly determined participant
In each round, your strength is:
The same
Randomly determined
The following decisions are imaginary and do not indicate what you should do in the experi-
ment. The numbers are randomly drawn.
Consider a round in which your strength is 889 and the other has a strength of 181.
{dynamic} You choose Fight after 7 seconds, before the other makes a decision.
{static} You choose Fight, the other chooses Flight. The other does not manage to get away, so
a FIGHT occurs.
If this round is selected for payment:
How much would you earn? ___ points
How much would the other earn? ___ points
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Consider a round in which your strength is 889 and the other has a strength of 181.
{dynamic} The other chooses Flight after 7 seconds, before you make a decision.
{static} You choose Fight, the other chooses Flight. The other manages to get away, so there is
NO FIGHT.
If this round is selected for payment:
How much would you earn? ___ points
How much would the other earn? ___ points
Consider a round in which your strength is 912 and the other has a strength of 130.
{dynamic} Both of you don’t make a decision within 10 seconds. You have to make a decision
simultaneously. You choose Flight, the other chooses Fight. You do not manage to get away, so
a FIGHT occurs.
{static} You choose Flight, the other chooses Fight. You do not manage to get away, so a FIGHT
occurs.
If this round is selected for payment:
How much would you earn? ___ points
How much would the other earn? ___ points
Consider a round in which your strength is 912 and the other has a strength of 130.
{dynamic} Both of you don’t make a decision within 10 seconds. You have to make a decision
simultaneously. Both of you choose Flight, so there is NO FIGHT. It is randomly determined
that you are the one who wins the prize without a Fight.
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{static} Both of you choose Flight, so there is NO FIGHT. It is randomly determined that you
are the one who wins the prize without a Fight.
If this round is selected for payment:
How much would you earn? ___ points
How much would the other earn? ___ points
{dynamic} Both of you don’t make a decision within 10 seconds. You have to make a decision
simultaneously. You choose Flight, the other chooses Fight. What is the chance that you can
get away?
{static} You choose Flight, the other chooses Fight. What is the chance that you can get away?
___ %
End of instructions
You have reached the end of the instructions. You can still go back by using the menu above.
If you are ready, click on ’continue’ below. If you need help, please raise your hand.
E.2 Experiment 2
Welcome
Welcome to this experiment on decision-making. Please read the following instructions care-
fully. If you have any questions, or if you experience technical difficulties during the experiment,
contact the experimenter via Zoom or email.
Today’s experiment consists of 2 parts. At the beginning of each part, you will receive new
instructions. You will spendmost time on the first part. Your decisions in one part have no influence
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on the proceedings or earnings of the other part.
Earnings
Your decisions and those of other participants will determine your earnings. Your earnings will
be paid to you via bank transfer shortly after today’s session. You will only receive your payment
if you finish all parts of the experiment. Please enter your IBAN below:
IBAN:
IBAN:
Please enter your IBAN twice to make sure that you entered it correctly.
All your earnings will be denoted in points.
At the end of the experiment, each point that you earned will be exchanged for 70 eurocents.
You will be given a starting capital of 21 points. Any profits or losses you make today will be
added to or subtracted from this starting capital.
Part 1
This part consists of 40 rounds. In each round you will be randomly paired with another
participant. Therefore, in each round you will (most likely) be paired with a different participant
than in the previous round. You will never learn with whom you are paired. At the end of the
experiment, one of the rounds of Part 1 will be randomly selected for payment. Your earnings for
Part 1 will be completely determined by what happened in this round.
Description of the situation and possible earnings
In each round, there is a prize of 10 points to get for one of you. If a fight occurs between you
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and the other participant, the strongest participant will earn the prize of 10 points and the weaker
participant will lose 10 points.
{k = −6} Each of you can also try to avoid a fight by choosing FLIGHT. If a participant
manages to flee, there is no fight, and the participant who chose FLIGHT guarantees him- or
herself 0 points (instead of winning or losing 10 points depending on his or her strength). The
participant that did not choose FLIGHT then automatically receives the prize of 10 points minus a
cost of 6 points because he or she let the other get away (thus earning 4 points in total).
{k = 6} Each of you can also try to avoid a fight by choosing FLIGHT. If a participant manages
to flee, there is no fight, and the participant who chose FLIGHT guarantees him- or herself 0 points
(instead of winning or losing 10 points depending on his or her strength). The participant that did
not choose FLIGHT then automatically receives the prize of 10 points plus an additional 6 points
because he or she did not have to fight for the prize (thus earning 16 points in total).
{k = 12} Each of you can also try to avoid a fight by choosing FLIGHT. If a participant man-
ages to flee, there is no fight, and the participant who chose FLIGHT guarantees him- or herself 0
points (instead of winning or losing 10 points depending on his or her strength). The participant
that did not choose FLIGHT then automatically receives the prize of 10 points plus an additional
12 points because he or she did not have to fight for the prize (thus earning 22 points in total).
{k = −6} If both of you choose FLIGHT at the same time, it will be randomly determined who
wins the prize at a cost and who flees. So one of you will earn 4 points and the other will earn 0
points, and each possibility is equally likely.
{k = 6} If both of you choose FLIGHT at the same time, it will be randomly determined who
86
wins the prize together with the bonus and who flees. So one of you will earn 16 points and the
other will earn 0 points, and each possibility is equally likely.
{k = 12} If both of you choose FLIGHT at the same time, it will be randomly determined who
wins the prize together with the bonus and who flees. So one of you will earn 22 points and the
other will earn 0 points, and each possibility is equally likely.
When will a fight occur?
Each round consists of 4 time periods. In each time period, you have 5 seconds to make a
decision. You and the other participant have the option to choose FIGHT or FLIGHT. Except for
the final time period, you also have the option to wait and thereby postpone your decision to a later
time period.
If both of you choose FIGHT in the same time period, or one of you chooses FIGHT in a time
period while the other decided to wait in that time period, a fight occurs.
If both of you choose FLIGHT in the same time period, or one of you chooses FLIGHT in a
time period while the other decided to wait in that time period, there is no fight.
If one of you chooses FLIGHT in the same time period that the other chooses FIGHT, a fight
occurs 90% of the time. In the other 10% of the time, the person who chose FLIGHT manages to
avoid a fight. So on average, the person that chose FLIGHT will get away 1 out of 10 times that
you end up in such a scenario.
The possible scenarios are illustrated in the figure below.
Strength
At the start of each round, each participant will be informed of her or his strength in that round.
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• A participant’s strength will be a random number between 0 and 1000 (0 and 1000 are also
possible). Each of these numbers is equally likely.
• In each round, every participant is assigned a new (and independent) strength. Therefore,
the different participants (most likely) have different strengths in a round, and the same
participant (most likely) has different strengths across rounds.
• At the start of a round, each participant is only informed about her or his own strength.
• It is very unlikely that both players have the same strength, but if this happens it will be
randomly determined who is the stronger player.
At the end of a round, each participant will be informed of the outcome, the other participant’s
strength and the resulting payoffs.
Decision screen
Below you can test how the decision screen works. You can do this by clicking on "show
example" below. You can do this as many times as you like by clicking on "show example" again.
If you understand the screen, click on "go to practice questions" to continue.
Question 1
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In each round, you are matched with:
the same participant
a randomly determined participant
Question 2




The following decisions are imaginary and do not indicate what you should do in the experiment.
The numbers are randomly drawn.
Consider a round in which your strength is 925 and the other has a strength of 4. You choose
FIGHT in time period 2, while the other was still waiting.
If this round is selected for payment:
How much would you earn? ___ points
How much would the other earn? ___ points
Note: enter the earnings without the starting capital of 21 points. You can enter losing an
amount by using a minus sign. For example, losing 10 points should be entered as -10.
Question 4
The following decisions are imaginary and do not indicate what you should do in the experiment.
The numbers are randomly drawn.
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Consider a round in which your strength is 925 and the other has a strength of 4. The other
chooses FLIGHT in time period 2, while you were still waiting.
If this round is selected for payment:
How much would you earn? ___ points
How much would the other earn? ___ points
Note: enter the earnings without the starting capital of 21 points. You can enter losing an
amount by using a minus sign. For example, losing 10 points should be entered as -10.
Question 5
The following decisions are imaginary and do not indicate what you should do in the experiment.
The numbers are randomly drawn.
Consider a round in which your strength is 14 and the other has a strength of 854. Both of
you make a decision in time period 3. You choose FLIGHT, the other chooses FIGHT. You do not
manage to get away, so a fight occurs.
If this round is selected for payment:
How much would you earn? ___ points
How much would the other earn? ___ points
Note: enter the earnings without the starting capital of 21 points. You can enter losing an
amount by using a minus sign. For example, losing 10 points should be entered as -10.
Question 6
The following decisions are imaginary and do not indicate what you should do in the experiment.
The numbers are randomly drawn.
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Consider a round in which your strength is 14 and the other has a strength of 854. Both of you
make a decision in time period 4. Both of you choose FLIGHT, so there is no fight. It is randomly
determined that you are the one who wins the prize without a fight.
If this round is selected for payment:
How much would you earn? ___ points
How much would the other earn? ___ points
Note: enter the earnings without the starting capital of 21 points. You can enter losing an
amount by using a minus sign. For example, losing 10 points should be entered as -10.
E.3 Lottery task
In this task, you are presented 6 lotteries, and for each lottery you decide whether to accept or
reject it. In each lottery the winning amount is fixed at 6 points. The losing amount varies between
lotteries. At the end of the experiment, one of the 6 choices is selected at random, and your choice
for this lottery together with a coin flip of a fictitious coin will determine your outcome.
If you rejected the selected lottery, your outcome will certainly be 0 points.
If you accepted the selected lottery, the computer will flip the coin, and the outcome will be
heads with 50% probability and tails with 50% probability. If the outcome is heads, you lose the
stated amount of the lottery. If the outcome is tails, you win 6 points.
Choice Lottery Accept Reject
1 lose 2 points (if heads turns up) or win 6 points (if tails turns up) O O
2 lose 3 points (if heads turns up) or win 6 points (if tails turns up) O O
3 lose 4 points (if heads turns up) or win 6 points (if tails turns up) O O
4 lose 5 points (if heads turns up) or win 6 points (if tails turns up) O O
5 lose 6 points (if heads turns up) or win 6 points (if tails turns up) O O
6 lose 7 points (if heads turns up) or win 6 points (if tails turns up) O O
You have to choose for each of the lotteries whether you accept or reject it.
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If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your desk.
E.4 Joy of winning measure
In this task you will be randomly and anonymously matched with another participant. You
and the other participant will choose how much to bid in order to be a winner. The reward is
worth 0 points to you and the other participant. You may bid any number of points between 0 and
4 (including increments of 0.1 points). After both participants have made their decisions, your
earnings will be calculated as follows.
Earnings = 0 − your bid
After both participants make their bids, the computer will make a random draw based on these
bids and determine who the winner is. At the end of the experiment, the computer will display the
results of this task (that is, whether you won or not), and will calculate your earnings.
The more you bid, the more likely you are to be the winner. The more the other participant
bids, the less likely you are to be the winner. Specifically, for each 0.1 points that you bid you will
receive one lottery ticket. At the end of today’s experiment, the computer will draw randomly one
ticket among the tickets purchased by you and the other participant. The owner of the drawn ticket
will be the winner. Thus, your chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of points you
bid divided by the total number of points you and the other participant bid.
Your chance of winning = (your bid)(your bid + the other participant’s bid)
If both participants bid zero, the winner is randomly determined.
Please make your decision below.
Your bid: ___
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